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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Russell Allen Passons appeals from the denial of his petition for post—conviction

relief.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

Passons stole a baby stroller/car seat and a television from Wal-Mart.

When

123-24.)

The

16, 124.)

confronted by store personnel he threatened them With a knife.

state

(R., pp. 18, 124.)

(R., pp.

charged Passons with burglary and two counts of aggravated assault.

Passons was convicted, and challenged his conviction by ﬁling a petition

for post-conviction relief.

that

(R., pp. 16,

(R., pp. 9-12, 16-33.)

Passons asserted, among other things}

he had received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his right to

representation

The
pp. 58-103.)

was

state

He

self-

violated. (R., pp. 20-25.)

moved

for

summary dismissal.

Passons responded.

(R., pp. 41-55.)

also presented evidence in support ofhis claims. (R., pp. 104-17;

(R.,

ﬂ alﬂ

Exhibits.)

The

district court

granted the motion for

summary

dismissal except for a claim 0f

ineffective assistance for failure t0 claim an illegal sentence but, because that claim

was

Which was the issue

in a

raised in a motion to correct an illegal sentence, the denial 0f

pending appeal, the
123-49.)

district court

The Idaho Supreme Court later afﬁrmed the

no double jeopardy Violation

1

stayed the case until that appeal

Passons created a

list

in the use

of his 13 claims.

0f the same

1

(R., pp.

denial ofthe Rule 35 motion, ﬁnding

facts to

(R., p. 119.)

was completed.

both enhance the crime from a

misdemeanor

to a felony

and

to

apply the deadly weapon enhancement. State

163 Idaho 643, 646-49, 417 P.3d 240, 243-46 (2018). The state later

moved

V.

for

Passons,

summary

dismissal ofthe remaining claim. (R., pp. 161-65.) Passons responded to the motion. (R.,
pp. 238-40.)

The

district court

a judgment of dismissal.
pp. 250-58.)

granted the motion 0n the last remaining count and entered

(R., pp. 246-48.)

Passons ﬁled a timely notice of appeal.

(R.,

ISSUES
Passons states the issues 0n appeal

1.

Did

as:

the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Passons’

petition for post-conviction relief because he alleged facts that established
that

he was denied a meaningful opportunity to represent himself in
Amendments to the United States

Violation 0f the Sixth and Fourteenth

Constitution?

2.

Did

the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Passons’

petition for post-conviction relief because he alleged facts that established

he received ineffective assistance 0f counsel in Violation of the Sixth and
Fourteenth

Amendments

t0 the

United States Constitution?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)

The
1.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Passons

failed t0

show error in the district court’s summary dismissal of a claim
was violated, because re-administering warnings 0n the

that his right t0 self—representation

risks

2.

of self—representation in no

Has Passons

failed t0

way violated Passons’

right to self—representation?

show error in the district court’s summary dismissal 0f claims

0f ineffective assistance of counsel because Passons failed to submit evidence showing

primafacie claims 0f deﬁcient performance 0r prejudice?

ARGUMENT
I.

Passons Has

Shown No

To
A.

The Summary Dismissal Of His Claim That His Right

Error In

Self—Representation

Was Violated

Introduction
In opposing the state’s motion for

self—representation

was

summary

dismissal of his claim that his right to

infringed, Passons argued that

When he

“kept meeting obstacles t0

his self—representation the arraignment judge (Judge Luster) suggested that Passons stop

his self—representation

and have the public defender represent him,” Which prodded him

give up his previously exercised right 0f self representation. (R., p. 72.)

argument with

citations t0 the record

district court, the district

showing

He

t0

supported this

that at the initial arraignment before the

judge, after accepting Passons” not guilty plea, stated he Wished

t0 discuss Passons’ right to counsel. (Exhibits, p. 456.)

The

district court

informed Passons

that

he qualiﬁed for appointed counsel, and that he had a constitutional right both to counsel

and

to self—representation.

“previously

that

made

(Exhibits, p. 456.)

that decision”

The court recognized

by representing himself

that Passons

had

in the magistrate division,

and

whether to proceed with standby counsel was Passons’ choice. (Exhibits,

district court

p. 456.)

The

then warned Passons about the hazards of self—representation and the beneﬁts

ofrepresentation by a trained lawyer. (Exhibits, pp. 456-57.) Thereafter Passons consulted

with his standby counsel and stated that he wished to be represented by counsel. (Exhibits,
p. 457.)

In post-conviction the district court (With a different judge) rejected Passons’ claim

that his right t0 self—representation

that the district

was

infringed. (R., pp. 133-37.)

The

district court

judge in the criminal case did not Violate Passons’ right t0

held

self-

representation

by

inquiring at the arraignment whether Passons desired to continue self-

representation. (R., pp. 135-37.)

On

appeal, Passons ﬁrst argues his right t0 self—representation

failure t0 provide

13.)

adequate resources to prepare his defense.

This argument

is

by re-administering

B.

Standard

by

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-

district court violated his right to self—representation

the warnings of the disadvantages 0f self—representation,

persuaded him t0 invoke his right to counsel. (Appellant’s
although preserved,

violated

not preserved. Even if preserved, the record does not support this

Passons next argues that the

claim.

was

fails

because

it

brief, p. 13.)

which

This argument,

lacks any legal support.

Of Review

“‘[W]hen reviewing a
conviction relief proceeding,

district court’s

we

order of

summary

dismissal in a post-

apply the same standard as that applied by the

district

court.” Takhsilov V. State, 161 Idaho 669, 672, 389 P.3d 955, 958 (2016) (quoting R_idgl_ey

m,

148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (2010)). “[W]hen reviewing the summary

dismissal 0f a petition for post-conviction relief, this Court must determine Whether a

genuine issue of fact exists based 0n the pleadings, depositions and admissions together
with any afﬁdavits on ﬁle.”

I_d.

“A genuine issue 0f material fact exists when the appellant

has alleged facts in his petition that if true, would entitle him to relief.” Stanﬁeld V. State,

165 Idaho 889, 894, 454 P.3d 531, 536 (2019) (internal quotations omitted). However, the
petition

“must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting

allegations, or the application Will

be subject

t0 dismissal.” State V.

Page, 146 Idaho

its

548,

561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008). “This Court exercises free review over questions 0f law.”

Severson

V. State,

159 Idaho 517, 520, 363 P.3d 358, 361 (2015).

C.

Passons’ Argument That His Right

T0

Self—Representation

Was

Violated

BV Not

Making Resources Available Is Not Preserved, And His Argument That The Right
Was Violated By The Second Provision Of Faretta Warnings Is Without Merit

Below Passons presented
violated

by

the theories that the his right to self—representation

(1) not treating Passons’ invocation

substitution of counsel

and

(2) providing

was

0f his right to counsel as a request for

m

accepted Passons’ waiver of the right to counsel.

warningsz after the magistrate had

The

(R., pp. 72-76.)

speciﬁcally rejected these two arguments. (R., pp. 133-37.)

district court

On appeal Passons argues that

he was denied the right t0 self—representation because he was denied adequate resources t0
represent himself and because

the

district

court re-administered

m

warnings.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-13.) Although the second of these two appellate arguments

preserved, the ﬁrst

is not.

“‘Issues not raised

parties will

is

below

Will not

be considered by

0n appeal, and the

this [C]ourt

be held t0 the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower c0urt.”’

State V. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217,

_, 443 P.3d 23

State V. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275,

1,

235 (2019) (brackets

original) (quoting

396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017)). Comparison

0f the ﬁrst argument Passons makes on appeal and the arguments he made below, which
the district court ruled on,

Therefore the

new

shows

that

Passons

is

presenting a

appellate theory cannot be considered

by this

new

theory on appeal.

Court.

Passons’ argues on appeal that he was denied sufﬁcient resources t0 represent
himself. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10- 1 3 .)

2

“Faretta warnings” are required t0

He did not make this argument to the district court.

make

a defendant seeking to invoke the right to self-

9”
representation “‘aware of the dangers and disadvantages 0f self—representation
before

waiving the right to counsel. State
(2007) (quoting Faretta V.

Dalrvmple, 144 Idaho 628, 634, 167 P.3d 765, 771
California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)).
V.

6

(R., pp. 72-76.)

The

district court in

post-conviction did not rule on the sufﬁciency of the

resources provided t0 facilitate self—representation.

(R., pp. 135-37.)

appellate theory of how his right to self—representation

resources

was not presented

was

to the district court below,

violated

by

Because Passons’
failing t0 provide

not preserved for appellate

it is

review.

Even

if preserved,

Passons’ appellate theory

representation necessarily includes and

prepare a defense.”

Amendment

Taylor

V. List,

is

is

Without merit.3 “[T]he right to

premised upon the right of the defendant to

880 F.2d 1040, 1047 (9th

Cir. 1989).

“[T]he Sixth

requires only that a self—represented defendant’s access to the resources

necessary t0 present a defense be reasonable under all the circumstances.”

m,

253 P.3d 1153, 1169-70 (Cal. 201

omitted).

A

premise” of

this claim, “i.e., the actual

V.

(emphasis original, internal quotations

1)

489

inadequacy of available resources.”

Amendment does

and therefore access

exceed the Fifth

to legal materials that

Amendment. United

not Violate the Sixth

People

V.

However, a self—represented defendant’s Sixth

(Cal. 2002).

right to access t0 legal materials does not

to access t0 courts,

3

People

defendant claiming Violation 0f this right must “establish the underlying

La_wley, 38 P.3d 461,

Amendment

self-

Amendment right

does not Violate the Fifth

States V. Wilson,

690 F.2d

Passons invokes the standard for a self—represented defendant’s right to access t0 legal

materials adopted
10-13.)

by the Ninth

The Ninth

Circuit and

some

Circuit has recognized that

California courts. (Appellant’s brief, pp.

its

standard

is

“[s]omewhat more generous

than other courts which have addressed this issue.” United States V. Robinson, 913 F.2d
712, 717 (9th Cir. 1990).

The

should be adopted in Idaho.

state

E

does not concede that

Reed

V. Schriro,

290

F.

this standard is correct, or that

App’X 982, 984

(“The Supreme Court has never established a clear Sixth
legal materials for pro se defendants.”).

under

this

“somewhat more generous”

Amendment

it

(9th Cir. 2008)

right

0f access t0

However, because Passons’ argument

fails

even

standard, the state Will address only the merits of

Passons’ application of that standard t0 the facts of this case.
7

1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Nowhere did the Faretta Court suggest that the Sixth

Amendment

right t0 self—representation implies

ﬁthher rights t0 materials,

investigative or educational resources that might aid self—representation.

interpret the right to self—representation

own research

conduct one’s

at

under the Sixth

We

decline t0

t0 include a right to

that Passons

was denied access

t0 resources to

In this case the magistrate granted Passons’ motion to represent

himself and appointed standby counsel. (Exhibits, pp. 393-99, 403.) Four days

September
p. 401.)

4,

or

government expense.”).

The record contains n0 evidence
prepare his defense.

Amendment

facilities,

later,

0n

2012, Passons ﬁled a motion t0 continue the preliminary hearing. (Exhibits,

At a hearing two days before the scheduled preliminary hearing the magistrate

denied the motion to continue. (Exhibits pp. 405-06, 448.) Passons ﬁled a second motion
t0 continue the preliminary hearing

on the day of that hearing.

(Exhibits, pp. 410-1 1.)

The

magistrate denied this motion as well. (Exhibits, pp. 406, 792-93.)

After Passons was bound over t0 the district court, he ﬁled motions requesting

“unlimited law library time and legal supplies” (Exhibits, pp. 421-22), and $2,900 t0 hire

an investigator (Exhibits 434-37). At Passons’ arraignment the
not-guilty plea and then re-advised

“[C]0nvinced” by the

m

him of his

m

district court

warnings.

took Passons’

(Exhibits, pp. 456-57.)

warnings, Passons re-invoked his right t0 court—appointed

counsel. (Exhibits, p. 457.)

This record does not
representation

by

show any

potential Violation 0f Passons’ right t0 self-

denial 0f sufﬁcient resources t0 prepare his defense.

The magistrate

denied Passons’ request for a continuance of the preliminary hearing, based in part on

ﬁnding

that Passons’

had been speciﬁcally warned about the disadvantages of

its

self-

representation. (Exhibits, pp. 793-94.)

for unlimited

adVised of the

The

district court

did not rule on Passons’ request

law library access 0r money for an investigator before Passons, being

m

re-

warnings, invoked his right to counsel. (Exhibits, pp. 456-57.) The

record from the criminal case, presented as support for Passons’ claim, does not contain a
material issue of fact suggesting Passons’ ability t0 present his

own

defense Without

counsel was infringed.
Passons’

second argument, that the

representation

by re-administering

preserved, but

is

the

m

Without legal basis. The

district

court violated his right t0 self-

warnings (Appellant’s

district court

brief, p.

13)

is

reasonably inquired into whether

Passons understood the potential problems 0f self—representation after Passons had waived
the right t0 counsel and invoked the right t0 self—representation in the magistrate division.

Passons has cited n0 authority holding that inquiring whether a defendant properly
understood the

m

warnings, after a different judge accepted a waiver 0f counsel, in

any way negatively implicates the

right t0 self—representation,

contrary, the district court’s actions t0

much less violates

conﬁrm Whether Passons made

a

it.

T0 the

knowing and

voluntary waiver of his right t0 counsel were proper and should be encouraged. Because
Passons’ argument

defendant 0f the

unsupported by any legal authority holding that reminding a

m
is

warnings after that defendant has invoked the right t0

representation violates the defendant’s right t0

argument, though preserved,

is

meritless.

self—representation,

Passons’

self-

second

II.

Passons Has Failed To

Show

Error In The

Ineffective Assistance

A.

Summary Dismissal Of His Claim Of
Of Trial Counsel

Introduction

The

state

alleged Passons committed the charged crimes on June 21, 2012.

(Exhibits, pp. 379-81.)

Passons applied

for,

It

ﬁled the criminal complaint 0n July

2,

2012. (Exhibits,

p. 379.)

and was granted, representation by appointed counsel 0n August

3,

2012. (Exhibits, pp. 384-85.) Passons invoked his right t0 self—representation on August

He re-invoked his

30, 2012. (Exhibits, p. 393.)

right t0 appointed counsel

0n October

16,

2012. (Exhibits, pp. 456-57.)

At

the preliminary hearing held September 13, 2012, store security

Erlandson testiﬁed that he saw Passons taking a

TV

from Walmart and

employee Matt

that

When he and

another store employee confronted Passons, Passons drew a knife and threatened them in
order t0

make

his getaway.

security Videos,

pp. 802-08.)

(Exhibits, pp. 796-801.) Erlandson then

Which showed Passons

The

earlier taking a

security recoding system can record

baby

up

to

watched the

stroller/car seat.

store’s

(Exhibits,

9O days 0f Video.4 (Exhibits,

p. 803.)

At

trial

Erlandson testiﬁed that the security Video he reviewed showed Passons

entering the store and taking the stroller/car seat without paying, then re-entering the store

and taking the TV. (Exhibits, pp. 180-88.) Passons’

act

of threatening the store employees

With the knife was not captured on Video, however, because the

4

way the particular camera

Although Passons alleged that exonerating Video evidence was destroyed

(R., p. 21),

he

presented no evidence that the electronic surveillance recording 0f the relevant time and
place for the aggravated assault

was not downloaded by Erlandson when he downloaded
was

the Video of the burglary and thefts, or that the Video related t0 the aggravated assaults

not provided by the state in discovery.
10

was

facing, at that time of day the Video

showed only “white

light”

from the sun. (Exhibits,

p. 184.)

In post-conviction Passons alleged that he told his appointed counsel that he did not

use a knife to threaten the store employees, that he was denied funds to hire an investigator
t0 obtain store Video,

assistance, nor get

and “standby counsel assigned to

any camera evidence preserved for

trial

me

did n0 investigation in

nor obtain comparable-in—time

footage from the day before and the day after the alleged burglary.”

(R., pp. 20-21.)

Passons also claimed ineffective assistance 0f counsel regarding calling defense Witnesses

and for

failing to object or

(R., p. 21.)

He

alleged he

instead of burglary and

The

cross-examine regarding alleged inconsistencies in testimony.

was prejudiced because he would have been convicted 0f theft

would have been acquitted 0f aggravated

district court

assault.

(R., p. 21.)

summarily dismissed Passons’ claims 0f ineffective assistance of

counsel. (R., pp. 127-32.) Passons asserts that the district court erred because he presented
potentially Viable claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to preservation of the

security Video, protecting his rights to self—representation, and presenting evidence at

trial.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-19.) Passons claims of error do not withstand scrutiny.

B.

Standard

Of Review

“[W]hen reviewing
this

the

summary

dismissal 0f a petition for post-conviction relief,

Court must determine Whether a genuine issue 0f fact exists based 0n the pleadings,

depositions and admissions together with any afﬁdavits on ﬁle.” Takhsilov, 161 Idaho at

672, 389 P.3d at 958.

11

C.

Shown N0 Error In The Summary
Assistance Of Counsel

Passons Has
Ineffective

Dismissal

Of His Claims Of

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed under a two-prong

test.

Strickland V. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Marsalis V. State, 166 Idaho 334,

_,

458 P.3d 203, 209 (2020). “T0 prevail on such a claim, the applicant for post—conviction
relief

must demonstrate

(1) counsel’s

reasonableness; and (2) there
result

would have been

483 (2008)

is

fell

below an objective standard of

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the

different.”

(citing Strickland,

performance

State V.

466 U.S.

at

Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476,
“Therefore, ‘[i]n order t0 survive a

687-88).

motion for summary dismissal, post-conviction
assistance 0f counsel

must

Strickland prongs.”

Marsalis, 166 Idaho at

relief claims

based upon ineffective

establish the existence of material issues 0f fact as to’ both

_,

458 P.3d

(quoting State V. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 383, 313 P.3d

1,

at

209 (brackets

39 (2013)). The

original)

district court

properly concluded that Passons had failed t0 raise a material issue 0f fact as to either

element of a Viable claim of ineffective assistance 0f counsel.

1.

Passons Did Not Allege

A

Viable Claim

Of

Ineffective Assistance

Of

Standby Counsel
There

Whether

is

n0 Sixth Amendment

to appoint standby counsel is

m

right t0 standby counsel or hybrid representation;

merely discretionary With the

trial court.

Williams, 163 Idaho 285, 297, 411 P.3d 1186, 1198 (Ct. App. 2018); State

V. Averett,

142

Idaho 879, 886, 136 P.3d 350, 357 (Ct. App. 2006) (“we hold that the appointment of
standby counsel

is

discretionary and not a matter of constitutional right”).

petitioner has “no constitutional right to counsel” he cannot Viably claim he

0fthe effective assistance of counsel.” Wainwright
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V.

Where

a

was “deprived

Toma, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982)

(because n0 right t0 counsel for discretionary appeal, no Viable claim 0f ineffective
assistance of counsel for conduct in seeking discretionary appeal).

not have a Sixth

Because Passons did

Amendment right t0 standby counsel, he cannot claim a Sixth Amendment

Violation through counsel’s performance. United States V. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 55 (2d

Cir.

1998) (“without a constitutional right t0 standby counsel, a defendant

relief for the ineffectiveness

(7th

is

not entitled t0

0f standby counsel”); Simpson V. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 585, 597

2006) (“the inadequacy of standby counsel’s performance, without the

Cir.

defendant’s relinquishment of his Faretta right, cannot give rise t0 an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment”). Because Idaho courts have rejected the

argument

that

Passons had a Sixth

Amendment right to standby counsel, Idaho

necessarily rejected claims that standby counsel violated Passons’ Sixth

courts have

Amendment

rights.

Even

if a Sixth

Amendment

Violation

were possible where there

is

Amendment right, Passons failed t0 show that standby counsel was ineffective.

no Sixth

Courts that

have recognized a constitutional Violation despite the lack of a constitutional right have
limited the potential Violation t0 “the narrow scope of advisory counsel’s proper role.”
La_wley, 38 P.3d at 491-92 (cited at Appellant’s brief, p. 15). That scope
there are constitutional “limits

McKaskle

V.

is

narrow because

on the extent of standby counsel’s unsolicited participation.”

Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 (1984). Passons presented n0 Viable claim that

standby counsel, properly respecting Passons’ right t0 act as his

own counsel,

did not fulﬁll

the narrow scope 0f his proper role.

Passons presented an afﬁdavit asserting that he “advised” standby counsel that he
“did not have a knife,” that “the story told by the Walmart security guards was not complete

13

nor true as t0 the knife,” and that he “wanted the Walmart store Videos 0f the alleged
crime.” (Exhibits, p. 783.) Passons then stated in his afﬁdavit that about a

standby counsel gave him the discovery provided by the

state,

surveillance video, but that standby counsel failed t0 assist
the preliminary hearing s0 he could review the Video.

p. 106.)

later his

which included the Walmart

him

in getting a continuance

(Exhibits, pp. 783-84;

ﬂ alﬂ

and presented

it

The

to Passons.

district court

properly

from the

rej ected

R.,

through discovery

role.

that,

under these

(R., pp. 127-30.)

contends that standby counsel should have directly subpoenaed

(Appellant’s brief, p. 15.)

the surveillance Video.

state

any claim

standby counsel did not act properly Within his or her narrow

On appeal Passons

However, Passons did not allege 0r

present evidence that he requested counsel to directly subpoena the recording (0r,

appropriately, assist

him

to

do

so).

Nor

that standby counsel

provided by the

0f the case.

state in

had a duty

more

did Passons present evidence that he informed

standby counsel that the Video produced by the

show

of

Thus, Passons himself presented evidence that in response to his inquiries about

the surveillance Video standby counsel obtained the Video

facts,

week

state

was incomplete. Passons does not

t0 independently

review the surveillance recording

discovery for completeness 0r compatibility with Passons’ theory

Finally, Passons has presented

n0 evidence (only

his unsubstantiated

allegations) that the state did not provide all relevant surveillance Video in discovery, but

that neither side

used the recording related t0 the aggravated assaults

showed nothing but White
allegations

light as testiﬁed t0

by

the

Walmart

at trial

security ofﬁcer.

because

it

Passons’

and factual recitation do not present a Viable claim of a Sixth Amendment

Violation even if he

had a Sixth Amendment right to have standby counsel perform a limited

role.
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Passons’ Claim That Counsel Inadequatelv Protected His Right

2.

Representation

Passons

alleged

that

T0

Self-

Was Properly Dismissed
inadequate

representation

by standby counsel was

a

contributing factor in his re-invocation of the right to counsel, and that appointed counsel

was

ineffective for not raising a claim that his waiver 0f the right to self—representation

inadequate. (R., pp. 22-24.)

As

set forth

above in more

detail, there is

the district court’s re-administration of the Faretta warnings

in

any way infringed upon the

to counsel

right t0 self—representation.

was

in

was

no Viable claim that

any way improper or

Moreover, by invoking his right

Passons waived his right to self—representation, and no inquiry as t0 the

“adequacy” of that waiver was required.

A

criminal defendant cannot “inadequately”

invoke the right t0 counsel.

On appeal Passons

argues counsel should have argued that “the district court failed

t0 adequately determine

Whether Mr. Passons’ knowingly and voluntarily waived his right

to self—representation.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 16.)

However, Passons has

indicating that a district court must,

upon receiving a request

determine Whether the defendant

knowingly and voluntarily waiving

is

cited

for appointment of counsel,

his right t0 self-

representation. Passons has failed t0 demonstrate that counsel’s performance

0r that he

was prejudiced by counsel’s

failure to

make

no cases

was deﬁcient

a motion unsupported by any legal

authority.

3.

The

District Court Properly

Assistance

Dismissed Passons’ Claims

Of

Ineffective

Of Trial Counsel

“[C]ounsel’s choice 0f Witnesses, manner 0f cross-examination, and lack of
objection to testimony

fall

within the area of tactical, or strategic, decisions.”

Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 500, 348 P.3d

1,

15

115 (2015).

Such

State V.

strategic choices are

“‘Virtually unchallengeable.”’

Strickland 466 U.S. at 690).

Hinton
“‘There

V.

Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 275 (2014) (quoting

is

a strong presumption that counsel took certain

actions for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect.’”

State V. Hall, 163 Idaho

744, 820, 419 P.3d 1042, 1118 (2018) (brackets omitted) (quoting Yarborough V. Gentry,

540 U.S.

1,

8 (2003)). “Strategic

and tactical decisions Will not be second guessed or serve

as a basis for post-conviction reliefunder a claim of ineffective assistance 0f counsel unless

the decision

shown

is

have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the

to

relevant law 0r other shortcomings capable of objective review.”

Idaho 345, 386, 313 P.3d

“T0

1,

42 (2013) (brackets and quotation marks omitted).

establish prejudice, the petitioner

must show a reasonable probability

for the attorney’s deﬁcient performance, the

different.”

Zepeda

V. State,

reasonable probability

is

outcome of the

156 Idaho

trial

7, 11,

trial

152 Idaho 710, 713, 274 P.3d 11, 14

that,

but

would have been

(Ct.

App. 2012). “A

a probability sufﬁcient to undermine conﬁdence in the outcome.”

Du_nlap, 155 Idaho at 383, 313 P.3d at 39 (quotation

outcome of the

State V. Dunlap, 155

would have been

different

is

marks omitted).

Showing

that the

a “weighty burden.” Johnson V. State,

319 P.3d 491, 495 (2014).

Passons alleged that his counsel failed t0

call his

daughter t0 testify that she had

given him a debit card, Which testimony, he claimed, would have raised a reasonable doubt
as t0 his motive to

commit

theft

and thus resulted in only a conviction for

burglary. (R., pp. 2 1 , 64, 105; Exhibits, p. 783.)

theft

and not

He ﬁthher alleged that trial counsel should

have cross-examined the Walmart security ofﬁcer Whether the surveillance Video regarding
the aggravated assault that he testiﬁed

light 0r if it in fact actually

showed only white

light in fact

showed that Passons displayed his keys
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only showed white

instead 0f a knife. (R.,

pp. 20-21, 63.)

Passons also alleged that the witnesses

gave different testimony

at trial

about the knife he used to threaten them, and counsel failed t0 cross—examine them or obj ect
t0 their testimony.

(R., pp. 21, 63, 107; Exhibits, p. 785.)

Passons’ claims of ineffective assistance 0f trial counsel were properly dismissed
for failure t0 rebut the presumption that counsel

was

effective With evidence of

objective shortcoming, and for failure t0 present evidence 0f prejudice.

any

(R., pp. 130-32.)

Passons’ unsubstantiated and general claims 0f deﬁcient performance and prejudice did
not

show a primafacie claim 0f ineffective

On
attempt to

assistance of counsel.

appeal Passons argues these claims were improperly dismissed, but makes no

show from the record that he presented evidence of an

rebut the presumption that counsel’s performance

16-17.)

He

was

obj ective shortcoming t0

reasonable. (Appellant’s brief, pp.

also claims prejudice, again Without citing to

any evidence presented showing

a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s
alleged deﬁciencies.

individually

or

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-17.)

cumulatively,

in

the

district

Passons has failed t0 show

court’s

summary

dismissal

error,

of his

unsubstantiated and unsupported claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 afﬁrm the

summarily dismissing Passons’ petition for post-conviction

district court’s

relief.

DATED this 2lst day 0f May, 2020.
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Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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